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Much of corporate law consists of nonmandatory statutes. Although
scholars have examined the effect of nonbinding corporate law from
a theoretical perspective, only inconclusive event studies explore the
real-world impact of these laws. This article empirically examines
the impact of nonmandatory state anti-takeover statutes. Several conclu-
sions emerge. Despite its nonbinding nature, corporate law makes
an enormous difference in outcomes, contradicting those who claim that
corporate law is trivial. Two types of nonmandatory corporate laws
have particularly important effects. Corporate default laws that favor
management are considerably less likely to be changed by companies
than default laws favoring investors, supporting those who believe that
corporate default laws can ameliorate asymmetries in incentives or bar-
gaining power between managers and investors. Corporate “menu” laws—
opt-in laws that are drafted by the state but do not apply as default rules—
also facilitate the use of some provisions, supporting those who believe
that nonmandatory corporate law reduces transaction costs, such as the
cost of updating corporate charters to reflect developments in the
economy.
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I. Introduction
Much of corporate law consists of nonmandatory “enabling” statutes.1 These
nonbinding statutes fall into two categories. Some corporate enabling stat-
utes create default rules—if the corporate documents are silent, then the
default statutory terms apply.2 Other statutes create “menu” options.3 These
statutes do not apply to corporations unless corporations explicitly signal
that they wish to be bound by the terms of the “menu” statute by “opting-in”
to the terms of the statute.4
Scholars debate the purpose and value of corporate enabling statutes,
focusing on the choice of default rules. Some, following the logic of the
Coase theorem, say that corporate enabling statutes establishing default
rules or menus are irrelevant—if investors and managers desire a certain
corporate arrangement, then they will write corporate contracts to obtain
that outcome, with or without “enabling” statutes.5 Others (transaction-cost
1Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416,
1417 (1989).
2For a seminal discussion of default rules, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989). Because
this article focuses on default laws, the terms “default law” and “default rule” will be used
interchangeably.
3Menus operate at several levels of abstraction. First, all of corporate law is a menu, with
companies “opting in” to the corporate code through the act of incorporation. Second, once a
company has chosen to incorporate, the state may provide further menu options by writing
statutes that apply to a corporation only if the corporation explicitly opts in to the corporate
menu statute. This article examines the second type of menu, although the results are relevant
to the first type of menu as well. For discussions of the types of menus emphasized here, see Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U.
Chi L. Rev. 1391, 1416 (1992) [hereinafter, Ayres, Making a Difference]; Ian Ayres, Menus
Matter, 73 U. Chi L. Rev. 3 (2006). See also Robert Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51 (1992) (discussing menus in the context
of bankruptcy); Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Law and the Limits of Contract, 113
Yale L.J. 541 (2003).
4A statutory scheme may be considered a menu if it offers even one option that does not apply
as a default rule. Thus, the “menu” might be very short, consisting of only one opt-in option (as
well as a default rule). This differs from the common-sense notion of menus as offering a wide
variety of options.
5See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 542 (1990).
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minimizers) claim that corporate enabling statutes reduce transaction costs.6
Instead of requiring parties to draft and negotiate similar provisions time after
time, the state should provide the public good of enabling statutes to reduce
the time and expense of creating and revising corporate arrangements.
State-provided enabling statutes also reduce transaction costs by reducing the
cost of adjusting outdated rules and facilitating network effects.7 Still others,
called “principal-agent minimizers,” argue that drafting and negotiation costs
are relatively inconsequential in corporate law settings, and emphasize the
importance of corporate laws that create default rules as opposed to menu
laws.8 Well-chosen statutory default rules enhance efficiency by mitigating
principal-agent problems between managers and investors.9
The stakes in this theoretical debate are high, but relatively little
empirical evidence exists to support or refute the various arguments.10
6See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1444–45.
7See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2006) (corporate
law reduces the cost of continually updating corporate arrangements); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997) (examining the value of network effects for standard-
ized law and corporate documents); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995) (same).
8See Ayres, Making a Difference, supra note 3, at 1397; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 489 (2002) (advo-
cating nonmajoritarian default rules but accepting that corporate laws may reduce transaction
costs); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 68 (1993) [hereinafter
Romano, Genius].
9A fourth opinion emphasizes the importance of the status quo bias for default laws in contract
law. These scholars believe that default laws alter preferences and change outcomes because
individuals tend to believe that the default rule is better than alternatives. See Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998). The status quo
bias is unlikely to be important in corporate law, however. The subjects of corporate law, such
as corporate executives and institutional investors, are sophisticated parties with financial
expertise. Moreover, these subjects tend to be repeat players, facing the same types of decisions
multiple times. These factors tend to reduce the status quo bias, as parties learn to pursue the
efficient outcome. See Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, supra note 3, at 551–52 n.18.
10Some exceptions that deal with related topics include Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do
IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L., Econ., & Org. 83
(2001) (examining use of various anti-takeover provisions, including anti-takeover statutes, by
firms going public); Raphael De Coninck, Do Firms Sufficiently Opt Out of Non-Mandatory
Laws? Evidence from Business Combination Statutes (Working Paper, NYU Law School, 2005)
(examining anti-takeover statute opt-out rates).
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Several event studies examine the impacts of the enactment of opt-out
anti-takeover statutes on the stock market value of companies incorporated
in the enacting state.11 These studies have the advantage of directly address-
ing the efficiency question. Their results are somewhat inconclusive,
however. Although the most comprehensive studies show slightly negative
stock price effects of anti-takeover statutes,12 Bhagat and Romano note that
“there are findings of negative, positive, and insignificant price effects [of
state anti-takeover statutes].”13
As with all event studies, the interpretation of these results is fraught
with difficulty. Market prices respond to new information only and anti-
takeover statutes are not written and passed in one day. Inconclusive results
may show that the statutes are irrelevant, or they may show that the statutes
were anticipated, or they may show that the statute increased value for some
companies and decreased it for others. Similarly, a positive stock price effect
on the announcement of an anti-takeover statute may reflect a positive
market assessment of the statute, or it may reflect the fact that the
announced statute was less restrictive of efficient takeover bids than the
anticipated statute. Moreover, stock price movements reflect the market’s
best guess of the actual impacts of the statute; the market may be wrong.
Finally, event studies do not reveal the mechanism whereby a statute might
add or detract from market value. Given the flaws of event studies, another
approach to the question of the true impact of anti-takeover statutes is
warranted.
In addition, the event studies all examine the impact of the passage of
opt-out default laws. They do not study the effect of opt-in menu statutes, an
important question for corporate law. Menus may be important, or they may
be irrelevant; the event studies do not address the question.
11See, e.g., John S. Jahera, Jr. & William Pugh, State Takeover Legislation: The Case of Delaware,
7 J. L., Econ., & Org. 410 (1991); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects
of Second Generation Takeover Legislation, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (1989); Jonathan M. Karpoff
& Paul H. Malatesta, State Takeover Legislation and Share Values: The Wealth Effects of
Pennsylvania’s Act 36, 1 J. Corp. Fin. 367 (1995); Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos,
State Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill
1320, 31 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1992).
12Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second Generation Takeover
Legislation, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (1989).
13See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law, 4. Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 380,
390 (2002).
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This article attempts to fill these gaps by examining the impact of
corporate anti-takeover enabling statutes. In the late 1980s, a wave of non-
mandatory anti-takeover statutes swept through many state corporate law
regimes.14 “Fair price,” “business combination,” and “control share acquisi-
tion” statutes hindered the ability of hostile acquirers to take control of
publicly traded corporations.15 Although the role of these statutes in pre-
venting takeovers has now been surpassed by the poison pill, this was not
obviously the case when the statutes were being enacted. When these statutes
were passed, they were hotly contested and garnered considerable attention
and lobbying activity from managers and investor activists.
Because different states chose different statutory regimes, anti-takeover
statutes offer considerable variation with which to test the different theories
about nonmandatory corporate law.16 Most of the states that passed anti-
takeover legislation chose to allow companies to opt-out of the statutes—the
anti-takeover statutes were default laws. A number of states, by contrast,
failed to pass anti-takeover legislation of any sort. A few states made the
anti-takeover statutes mandatory. Finally, Georgia and Tennessee adopted
some of the anti-takeover statutes but required companies to opt in to the
law, offering the anti-takeover statutes as a menu option within corporate
law. A data set collected by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
records whether a large set of public companies chose to opt in or opt out of
the anti-takeover statutes of each company’s state of incorporation. This
variation in statutory regimes allows me to distinguish between different
theories of corporate enabling law.17
14For discussions of anti-takeover legislation, see Jack D. Isaacs, State Takeover Laws (2004);
Romano, supra note 8; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law:
The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 (1999); Roberta
Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate
Charters (Working Paper, 2005), available at 〈http://ssrn.com/abstract=706522〉.
15See Isaacs, supra note 14, at A-2 to A-5.
16See Isaacs, supra note 14.
17De Coninck examines firms in states that allow “opting out” of default anti-takeover statutes
and finds some evidence that managers in midstream companies lack incentives to efficiently
opt out of business combination anti-takeover statutes. See De Coninck, supra note 10. Unlike
De Coninck’s work, this article examines variation between opt-in and opt-out states, as well
as states without any anti-takeover protections. This method permits conclusions about the effi-
cacy of menu options and alternative default rules that are not addressed in De Coninck’s
framework.
What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? 283
The data indicate that both corporate default laws and menus matter
enormously (Figure 1). Only 20 percent of companies incorporated in states
without “fair price” statutes choose to write fair price protection into their
corporate charters. Over 50 percent of companies located in Georgia, which
has an opt-in menu statute, enjoy fair price protection. Almost all companies
(almost 98 percent) in states where fair price protection is the default rule
have fair price protection.
These results contradict the triviality hypothesis, which predicts that
none of these variations should matter because companies will always attain
their desired level of corporate governance. The failure of the triviality
hypothesis suggests that legislatures should continue to produce corporate
law.
The difference in initial transaction costs between opting in and
opting out of a statute is minimal. Therefore, the large difference in out-
comes between companies incorporated in opt-in versus opt-out states is
inconsistent with the transaction-cost minimization theory of corporate
enabling law.
The data also indicate that anti-takeover menus facilitate the adop-
tion of anti-takeover protections—the first time such an effect has been
demonstrated. The importance of menus is inconsistent with principal-
agent problem minimization theories of corporate law because menus do
not change default laws and require managers to obtain shareholder
approval for anti-takeover protection and therefore do not alter the
“balance of power” between managers and investors. The results support
transaction-cost minimization theories of corporate law, however. Menus





















reduce transaction costs by reducing the amount of drafting and negotia-
tion required to adopt anti-takeover protections. More importantly, menus
reduce transaction costs by offering a delegated third party (the state) that
can change outdated rules in an efficient manner.18 Menus also create a
focal point that engenders the formation of a network effect, which also
reduces transaction costs.19 Thus, corporate law menus may be both effi-
cient and effective.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II discusses state anti-takeover
statutes. Section III surveys the existing literature on corporate enabling
law. Sections IV and V present the data sources, and derive predictions
for the data based on the theoretical literature. Section VI examines
the data and evaluates the performance of the hypotheses. Section VII
concludes.
II. State Anti-Takeover Legislation
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America upholding Indiana’s control share acquisition statutes,20 many states
passed a variety of anti-takeover statutes in the late 1980s.21 These statutes
hindered hostile bidders from easily obtaining control of a target corpora-
tion. This article focuses on three popular anti-takeover statutes, fair price
statutes, business combination statutes, and control share acquisition
statutes.
A. Fair Price Statutes
Fair price statutes are designed to prevent coercive two-tier tender offers. In
two-tier tender offers, a bidder offers a high price for a control block of
shares and then buys the remaining shares for a lower price.22 Two-tier
tender offers are coercive because a shareholder, when faced with such an
18See Hansmann, supra note 7.
19See Klausner, supra note 7.
20481 U.S. 69 (1987).
21For discussions of the purpose of the statutes, see Romano, Genius, ch. 4.
22Jack D. Isaacs, State Takeover Laws A-4, A-5 (2004).
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offer, feels compelled to tender his or her shares in the first tier, lest the
tender offer succeed and the shareholder be forced to accept a lower price
in the second tier.23
Fair price statutes require bidders who do not pay a “fair price” for all
shares to satisfy rigorous shareholder approval requirements. For example,
Connecticut’s representative statute dictates that a non-“fair price”24 two-tier
tender offer must be recommended by the target company’s board of direc-
tors and must be approved by 80 percent of outstanding shares and two-
thirds of shares not held by the bidder.25
Twenty-seven states enacted fair price statutes between 1983 and
1991.26 Three of these states made the fair price statute a mandatory
provision. One of the states, Georgia, enacted an opt-in fair price provi-
sion.27 The remaining 23 states that adopted fair price statutes allowed
companies to opt out of the statute. None of the states without fair price
statutes established fair-price-like protections as a default rule through judi-
cial precedent, although a number of SEC rules deter two-tier tender
offers.28
B. Business Combination Statutes
Business combination statutes, also known as “freeze-out” statutes, prohibit
certain types of transactions (such as mergers or asset sales) between a large
shareholder and a target company for a multi-year period after the large
23See Lucian A. Bebchuk, “The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy,” in
J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman, eds., Knights Raiders and Targets: The Impact
of Hostile Takeovers 371 (1988).
24A fair price is defined to mean the maximum of: “(1) the highest price paid for the target
company’s shares in the two years before the proposed acquisition was announced; (2) the
market value per share on the date the proposal was announced; (3) the value determined in
clause (2) multiplied by the highest price paid in the previous two years divided by the market
value of the common stock on the first date shares were acquired in the two year period.” Conn.
Gen Stat. Ann. §§ 33-840 to 33-842.
25Conn. Gen Stat. Ann. §§ 33-840 to 33-842.
26For details, see Isaacs, supra note 22.
27See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-2-111 to 14-2-1113.
28For a discussion of federal securities laws and rules regulating two-tier tender offers, see AmJur
§ 741, “Equal Treatment of Security Holders.”
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shareholder’s stake exceeds a prespecified amount. Board approval can
enable the transactions to move forward during the prohibited period.
Business combination statutes prevent bidders from obtaining the full
benefit of an acquisition for a long period following the initial acquisition
and thereby deter bids.29 Many business combination statutes were passed at
the same time as fair price statutes.
New York’s business combination statute is representative. The statute
“prevents a business combination between any 20 percent shareholder and
the target company for a period of five years after the 20 percent acquisition.
The law does not apply if the target company’s board approves either the 20
percent acquisition or the proposed business combination before the share-
holder acquired the 20 percent stake.”30
Thirty-two states passed business combination statutes.31 Four of these
states mandated the business combination statutes for all companies incor-
porated within the state. As with fair price statutes, only Georgia passed an
opt-in statute.32 The remaining 27 states allowed companies to opt out of the
business combination statute. None of the states without business combina-
tion statutes established business-combination-like protections as a default
rule through judicial precedent.
C. Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Control share acquisition statutes provide that acquisition of a controlling
block of shares does not ensure voting control.33 This deters the acquisition
of control blocks by bidders because the bidders cannot be confident that
their control can ever be exercised.
Indiana’s control share acquisition (CSA) statute, at issue in CTS, is
representative. The statute stipulates that the acquirer of 20, 33.33, or 50
percent of a company’s shares must obtain the approval of a majority of the
disinterested shares before the acquirer can exercise voting rights of the
29See Isaacs, supra note 22, at A-5.
30N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912.
31See Isaacs, supra note 22.
32See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-2-110, 14-2-1131 to 14-2-1133.
33See Isaacs, supra note 22, at A-2.
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control stake. If voting rights fail to be approved, the company can reacquire
the shares from the bidder at the market price.34
Twenty-six states adopted CSA statutes. None of the CSA statutes are
mandatory. One state, Tennessee, adopted an opt-in CSA statute.35 The
other 25 states enacted opt-out statutes. None of the states without CSA
statutes has established CSA-like protections as a default rule through judi-
cial precedent.
At present, fair price, business combination, and CSA statutes are little
noticed. Poison pills and staggered boards have become the anti-takeover
mechanisms of choice. At the time the statutes were passed, however, the
statutes were hotly debated. Before Delaware passed its business combina-
tion statute, for example, a combined session of both Delaware houses
heard over 10 hours of testimony about the potential benefits and costs of
the statute.36 Opponents of the statute claimed that it would severely
damage U.S. corporations, while managers testifying in favor of the statute
claimed that they would reincorporate in another state if Delaware failed to
pass the statute. All these actions make no sense if the business combina-
tion statutes were irrelevant at the time of passage. Given the emphasis
placed on defending or attacking these statutes, it is extremely unlikely that
companies that were public at the time of the statute’s passage stuck with
their state’s default rule because it was not worth the trouble of changing
the state’s default.
III. Testing Theories of Nonmandatory
Corporate Law
The “triviality,” “transaction-cost minimization,” and “principal-agent mini-
mization” theories of corporate law make sharply contrasting predictions
about the impacts of the anti-takeover statutes just described. These predic-
tions are summarized in Table 1.
34See Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11.
35See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-103-301 to 48-103-312.
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A. Predictions of the Triviality Hypothesis
According to the triviality hypothesis, corporate default rules simply “aren’t
very important” because “(i) even unsophisticated decisionmakers invariably
consult experts (called lawyers); (ii) the experts see similar issues repeatedly
and develop standard solutions; and (iii) the cost of using a privately devel-
oped standard form instead of the government’s form is small.”37
If corporate law is trivial, then none of the variations in state anti-
takeover laws just described should make any difference. Companies in states
with opt-in anti-takeover statutes should have the same level of protection as
companies in states with opt-out protections. Indeed, companies in states
without any anti-takeover statute should also enjoy the same level of protec-
tions, as companies that desire fair price, business combination, or CSA
protection can add such provisions to their charter.
B. Transaction-Cost Minimization Predictions
Many scholars assert that the purpose of corporate enabling laws is
transaction-cost minimization.38 By offering nonmandatory corporate laws,
the state saves individual parties from incurring the costs of drafting, nego-
tiating, and continually updating a set of terms, and provides for network
effects from using one set of terms widely. Transaction-cost minimizers
predict that more companies in states with opt-in anti-takeover laws should
enjoy anti-takeover protection than companies in no-law, no-precedent
states. The opt-in laws allow parties that would like anti-takeover protec-
tion but cannot afford the transaction costs to enjoy the anti-takeover
protections.
Transaction-cost minimization factors also suggest that companies in
opt-in states should have lower levels of anti-takeover protection than com-
panies in opt-out states. If a state is less likely to continually update an opt-in
statute than an opt-out statute, then the advantage of delegating modifica-
tions in corporate governance to the state is limited. Likewise, opt-in statutes
might be less likely to engender positive network externalities than opt-out
statutes. Opting in also incurs some transaction costs (a shareholder vote),
while opting out does not. The requirement to opt in therefore deters some
companies from enjoying anti-takeover protections. The size of these effects
37Black, supra note 5, at 557.
38See the citations in notes 6 and 7.
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should be small, however. States typically pass a limited number of opt-in
options, suggesting that the delegation advantages and network enhancing
effects of corporate statutes should remain. In addition, the difference in
transactions costs between opting in and opting out of similar statutes are
negligible (a simple bylaw amendment is all that is required to opt in).
Corporations engage in many votes, and the costs of each vote should be
minimal. Thus, transaction-cost minimizers would predict only a small dif-
ference in anti-takeover protection rates between companies in opt-in states
and companies in opt-out states.
C. Predictions of the Theory that Corporate Enabling Law Should Mitigate
Principal-Agent Problems
Principal-agent minimizers argue that transaction-cost minimization con-
siderations are unimportant in corporate law contexts;39 instead, principal-
agent concerns are of paramount importance. Because of shareholder
free-rider problems, superior management information, and managerial
control over the process of altering corporate charters, default rules that give
management considerable discretion (and are therefore favored by manage-
ment) will be much harder to change than default rules constraining man-
agement, which management will seek to change if at all possible.
If transaction costs are unimportant, as argued by many principal-agent
minimizers, then there should be little difference in anti-takeover protection
between companies in states without anti-takeover states and states with
opt-in statutes. In both types of states, the default rule is the same—managers
need to obtain approval for the anti-takeover law and therefore must reveal
the existence and terms of the anti-takeover law. The only difference
between the two categories is the transaction-cost minimizing menu benefits
of the opt-in statutes, but these are supposedly unimportant.
Principal-agent minimizers also predict that companies in opt-out
states should enjoy considerably more anti-takeover protection than compa-
nies in opt-in states. Opt-in states and opt-out states have similar statutes, but
different default rules. The default rule in opt-in states favors investors, while
the default rule in opt-out states favors managers. As described earlier,
principal-agent minimizers believe that superior information, incentives,
and control over the corporate agenda enable managers to maintain a
pro-manager default rule even when it is inefficient. Thus, some companies
39See discussion in Section I.
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in opt-out states may stick with the default rule even when it is inefficient. In
opt-in states, however, managers will not be able to exploit their advantages
to gain protection from the anti-takeover statutes when the statutes are
inefficient. Thus, companies in opt-out states should enjoy higher rates of
protection than companies in opt-in states.
These predictions, of course, reflect the principal-agent minimizers’
assumption that default rules can mitigate asymmetries between managers
and investors. If default rules are insufficient, then companies in opt-in and
opt-out states should enjoy similar levels of protection.
IV. Data, Summary Statistics, and Specification
A. Data Sources
These predictions will be tested using data from several sources. The primary
source of data is the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) Cor-
porate Takeover Defense Database.40 Every other year, the IRRC gathers data
on a myriad of anti-takeover features for a large group of companies. These
data include information on the existence of poison pills, classified boards,
supermajority provisions, and golden parachutes, among many other provi-
sions. Most importantly for this article, the data set includes information on
whether a company is incorporated in a state that has enacted a fair price,
business combination, or control share acquisition statute, and whether a
company has opted in or opted out of the statute if the statute exists.
The IRRC data also note whether a company has enacted a fair price
charter provision. The data set does not contain information regarding
business combination or control share acquisition charter amendments,
however. As a result, the empirical analyses that draw on data regarding
companies in no-law, no-precedent states focus on fair price provisions.
The IRRC data were supplemented with data from several other
sources. The data on each company from IRRC were matched with detailed
company-level data from Compustat and CRSP.41 Initial CRSP appearance
dates were used to determine if a company was publicly traded when anti-
40For a description of the data set, as well as variable definitions, see Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii
& Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107 (2003). The
data set is available from the Wharton Research Database Service (WRDS).
41Compustat and CRSP can be obtained from WRDS.
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takeover statutes were passed.42 In addition, additional data on the nature of
each state’s anti-takeover laws were obtained from the detailed descriptions
of the anti-takeover laws that can be found in the IRRC’s series on State
Takeover Laws.43
B. Summary Statistics
One cannot simply compare companies in opt-out states with companies in
no-law states and draw conclusions about the predictive power of different
theories of nonmandatory corporate law—the differences between opt-out
states and no-law, no-precedent states confound two effects. On the one
hand, companies in opt-out states may adopt anti-takeover protections at
greater rates than companies in no-law states because the statutes allow
managers to exploit their bargaining power over investors, particularly in
companies that were already public before the passage of the relevant stat-
utes (midstream companies).44 On the other hand, companies in opt-out
states may adopt anti-takeover provisions at higher rates because of the menu
effect—the existence of the statutes economize on transaction costs,
enabling more companies to enjoy efficient protections.
Opt-in rules allow me to distinguish between these two effects. The
difference in outcomes between opt-in states and no-law states is unlikely to
be the result of bargaining imbalances; in both states, managers must reveal
information and obtain investor approval. A difference between opt-in states
and opt-out states, by contrast, is unlikely to be the result of transaction-cost
minimization; in both cases, the state provides the benefits of delegation of
modification and enhancement of network effects. Table 2 presents mean
adoption rates for fair price, business combination, and CSA statutes in
companies that passed statutes as opt-out, opt-in, or mandatory rules, as well
as fair price charter provision rates for companies in states with no fair price
statute. Because a number of theories of corporate law emphasize the dis-
tinction between midstream and closely held companies, Table 2 presents
42To prevent time trends in anti-takeover protection adoption provisions from affecting the
results, midstream companies are defined to be the same for all states. Midstream status means
that the company went public before 1989.
43See Isaacs, supra note 22.
44For more on the distinction between already public (midstream) companies and companies
that go public after a statute is passed, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































results for two sets of companies. Columns I–III of Table 2 present data for
companies that were not yet public when the wave of anti-takeover statutes
were passed. Columns IV–VI present data for all companies, including mid-
stream companies.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show large differences in outcomes between
companies in opt-in, opt-out, and mandatory law states, and states without
statutes. These differences exist for companies that went public after the
passage of the statutes, as well as midstream companies. For example, 57
percent of Georgia companies that went public after Georgia passed its
opt-in fair price law opt in to the statute (Column I), and 56 percent of all
Georgia companies opt in to the fair price statute (Column IV and
Figure 1). These numbers are dramatically and statistically significantly less
than the adoption rates for companies in opt-out states. Fair price statutes
apply to 97 percent of companies incorporated in opt-out states that went
public after the passage of the statute, and 98 percent of all companies
incorporated in these states fail to opt out of the fair price statutes. These
differences in protection rates between opt-in and opt-out states are sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level.
The fair price protection rate for Georgia companies, however, far
exceeds the rate of fair price protection enjoyed by companies forced to
draft their own charter provisions. In no-law states, only 20 percent of all
companies and less than 10 percent of new companies draft fair price
charter provisions. The difference in protection rates between the Georgia
companies and the no-law companies is also significant at the 5 percent
level.
C. Identification Strategy
These results support the argument that default rules and menus matter
enormously for corporate law. They are hardly definitive, however. Selection
bias and omitted variable bias may cause systematic differences in anti-
takeover adoption rates between companies in different states.45 Simply put,
companies in states with one type of default rule or menu option may be
systematically different from companies in states with other legal regimes. If
45Note that the differences are unlikely to be the result of differences in statutory language
between the states because the anti-takeover statutes within a given class are very similar across
states. See Isaacs, supra note 22, at A-2 to A-6.
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this is the case, then differences in anti-takeover provision adoption rates
cannot be attributed to differences in corporate laws.
To control for the impacts of other variables, the article tests the effects
of default rules and menus using the following “random effects” specifica-
tion. (Results are provided for both a random effects logit model and for a
random effects linear probability model.46)
Y X default rule opt inct ct ct ct c ct= + ′ + ∗ + ∗ + +α β δ φ α ε_ _ (1)
where Yct indicates whether company c has a particular anti-takeover protec-
tion in time t, Xct is a vector of control variables, including company size,
profitability, Census division dummies, year dummies, debt levels, industry
dummies, a dummy for whether the company went public before or after the
passage of the statute, and measures of other governance features,47 includ-
ing the existence of golden parachute provisions, a measure of directorial
independence, the existence of secret balloting, and the existence of cumu-
lative voting provisions. ect is a mean zero, serially uncorrelated error term
and ac is a time-invariant company-specific “random effect” that is uncorre-
lated with ect or any of the other variables in the regression. The primary
variables of interest are default_rulect—a dummy variable indicating whether
the company is located in a state with an anti-takeover default statute—and
opt_inct—a dummy variable indicating whether the company is located in a
state with an opt-in anti-takeover statute. The effect of having an opt-in
statute will be estimated from this dummy.
An important concern about this specification (and any random effects
specification) is that it identifies the effects of the differences in legal rules
through (in part) cross-sectional variation. The cross-sectional variation
occurs at the state-level—the level of the differences in statutory regimes. As
a result, state-specific effects that impact anti-takeover protection levels and
are not controlled for by other variables (such as Census division effects)
46Linear-probability models are far easier to interpret than logit models and often provide more
policy-relevant estimates, but suffer from the obvious disadvantage of predicting that some
events occur with negative probability while others occur with probability greater than one. For
more details, see Angus Deaton, The Analysis of Household Surveys 85–92 (1998). Deaton
concludes that limited dependent variable models such as the logit or tobit are often (though
not always) “artificial and unnecessarily elaborate.”
47Poison pills and staggered board controls are not included in most specifications due to the
fact that these might act as substitutes for the anti-takeover protections studied here.
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cannot be distinguished from the impacts of the statutes. This concern is
heightened by the paucity of states (only one) with opt-in statutes.48
Several arguments suggest that these concerns do not undermine the
identification strategy. First, to this point no one has suggested that Geor-
gia’s companies are unique with respect to corporate governance, certainly
not when compared with companies in, say, North Carolina or Florida, and
after controlling for factors such as industry and company size. Georgia
companies pushed for the fair price and business combination statutes,
much as companies elsewhere did.49 Empirical evidence supports the argu-
ment that there are no obvious and important Georgia idiosyncrasies aside
from the existence of the opt-in statute. For example, Georgia companies
have enacted other important anti-takeover protections at the same rate as
companies in other states.50 Table 3 shows that Georgia companies adopt
poison pill and staggered board protections, for example, at comparable
rates to companies in opt-out states or mandatory law states (Columns
48Relatively few “treatment” companies will also lead to higher standard errors, but this does not
address the concern about unobservable state effects independent of the statutes.
49See Letter of William Carney (Apr. 7, 2005).
50Table 1 displays results for both pre and post-IPO companies in Georgia, but the results are
very similar for pre-IPO companies alone. Tennessee companies also have standard rates of
adoption for these anti-takeover provisions.










Adjusted corporate governance index 7.3 7.8 7.7
(005) (040) (009)
Poison pill adoption rate 53.8% 56.4% 55.2%
(1.1%) (8.0%) (1.8%)
Classified board adoption rate 56.7% 56.4% 60.4%
(1.1%) (8.0%) (1.8%)
Note: Each column presents results for groups of states with different statutory anti-takeover
protection regimes. Each row presents data for all companies (midstream and nonmidstream)
in the sample. Each cell presents the proportion of companies in the relevant state/midstream
status that enjoy the anti-takeover protections specified in the columns. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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II–III).51 One popular index of the quality of corporate governance, the
Gompers-Ishii-Metrick Corporate Governance Index,52 suggests that Georgia
companies have comparable corporate governance quality to companies in
other states. In some versions of Equation (1), I include other corporate
governance indexes to control for the possibility that Georgia companies
have idiosyncratic corporate governance features, although this addition
introduces the possibility of endogeneity bias because of substitution
between different anti-takeover measures such as fair price provisions and
poison pills.
I also run analogues of Equation (1) with other corporate governance
variables as the dependent variable. If Georgia firms are unique with respect
to corporate governance after controlling for other factors, then we would
expect a Georgia dummy variable to have important predictive effects for
many corporate governance measures, including, among others, the pres-
ence of a poison pill, existence of a classified board, and measures of direc-
torial independence. In none of these specifications is the Georgia dummy
even close to significant—in both statistical and economic senses. These
results provide further evidence that Georgia companies are not unique with
respect to most measures of corporate governance.
Another reason to doubt the uniqueness of Georgia is that Georgia’s
opt-in rule was the result of a little noted compromise within the Georgia bar
to support the enactment of fair price and business combination statutes but
not to make the statutes the default rules.53 For example, the opt-in status of
the rule went unmentioned in a comprehensive law review of the anti-
takeover statutes written by two Georgia practitioners.54 If Georgia’s opt-in
rule was not viewed as singularly important within Georgia, then there is less
chance that Georgia is unique.
51Doctrinally, the Georgia legislature and courts accept the poison pill. See Invacare Corp. v.
Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
52The governance index is adjusted to exclude the presence or absence of fair price, CSA, or
business combination protections.
53One factor in the opt-in statues of the rule may be Professor William Carney’s prominent role
on the committee drafting the statue. Professor Carney had earlier published an article favoring
opt-in statutes. See Letter of William Carney (Apr. 7, 2005). See Paul Quiros & Donna Ruth
Jones, Business Associations, 40 Mercer L. Rev. 61, 74 (1988).
54See Paul Quiros & Donna Ruth Jones, Business Associations, 40 Mercer L. Rev. 61, 74 (1988).
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A voluminous literature suggests that firms that incorporate in Dela-
ware are distinct from firms that incorporate in other locations.55 Differences
between Delaware incorporated firms’ and other firms’ fair price provision
take-up rates may be caused by different state laws, or they might be caused
by other unobservable differences in Delaware firms. To address the concern
that unobservable differences in Delaware firms cause results, I present
results including and excluding Delaware firms.
To assuage remaining doubts about disentangling idiosyncratic charac-
teristics of Georgia companies from the effect of opt-in statutes, I also present
a specification resembling a differences-in-differences analysis. Although the
data set includes no observations before the enactment of the statutes around
1986–1989, it does include data about the existence of corporate charter
amendments that provided fair price protection. The large majority of these
fair price charter amendments were enacted before fair price statutes were
passed. After the statutes were enacted, the large majority of firms with fair
price protection chose to use their state’s fair price statute rather than an
individual amendment.56 At the same time, however, the data indicate that
very few corporations chose to remove these charter amendments from their
charters after the enactment of the statutes.57 As a result, if a company has a fair
price charter or bylaw amendment in the data set, it is quite likely that this
amendment was enacted before the passage of a fair price statute. This
enables me to “look back” and see whether a firm had fair price protections
before the enactment of the fair price statutes. Note, however, that this
specification falls short of a true differences-in-differences because the
“before” observations are artificial and undoubtedly measured with error.58 As
55See, e.g., Feng Chen, Kenton K. Yee & and Yong Keun Yoo, Are Delaware Firms Oranges?
Fundamental Attributes and the Delaware Effect (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal
Studies, 2006), available at 〈http://ssrn.com/abstract=912942〉.
56Firms that went public after the passage of their states’ fair price statute promulgated fair price
charter amendments less than 10 percent of the time, while firms that were public before the
passage of the statute enjoyed fair price charter provisions over 30 percent of the time, provid-
ing indirect evidence that most fair price charter amendments were enacted before the passage
of the statutes.
57Almost no companies go from having a fair price charter amendment to not having an
amendment in later years.
58Because I do not know the year in which a fair price provision presumed to be adopted before
the statute was actually adopted, I cannot utilize control variables that change from year to year.
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a result, this specification should be viewed more as a robustness check than
a source of good estimates of the effect of different statutes. The “differences-
in-differences” specification is as follows:
ΔY default rule opt in xc c c c= + ∗ + ∗ + ′ +α β δ γ_ _ , (2)
where DYc represents the change in fair price protection status from “before”
fair price statutes were enacted to “after,” default_rulec is a dummy variable
indicating whether company c is in a state with a default rule statute, opt_inc
is a dummy variable indicating whether company c is in a state with an opt-in
fair price statute, and xc is a vector of control variables for company c. The
differences-in-differences analysis is run as a linear probability model.59 If
companies in states with fair price statutes are different with respect to fair
price protections, then we would expect them to have unusual levels of fair
price protection both before and after a fair price statute is passed. If the
passage of a statute has an important impact, by contrast, then the coeffi-
cients on the default rule and opt_in variables should be significant.
V. Results and Interpretation
A. Regression Results
Table 4 presents regression results for the specification described in Equa-
tion (1).60 The results indicate that both opt-in menu statutes and default fair
price statutes have important effects on the amount of fair price protection
enjoyed by companies. The linear-probability random effects regression esti-
mates that a company in a state with an opt-in fair price statute (in Georgia)
has a 0.22 greater chance of having fair price protection than an otherwise
similar company in a state without a statute. This difference is significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level. The difference is also economically
significant—Georgia companies are much more likely to have fair price
protection than their counterparts in states without fair price statutes.
In addition, the probability that a company with access to a fair price
default statute has fair price protection is 0.67 higher than it would be if the
same company was located in a state with no statute, and 0.45 higher than it
59The results are similar when a fixed effects logit model is applied.
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would be if the same company had access to Georgia’s opt-in statute. Again,
all these differences are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level and economically significant as well. Fair price protection rates for
otherwise similar companies are much higher when the company is incor-
porated in a state with a fair price default law.
The results change little when Delaware companies are excluded
(Column 2 of Table 4), suggesting that the impact of opt-in and default law
fair price statutes are not caused by unobservable Delaware-company-specific
characteristics. Fair price protection rates for non-Delaware companies in
default rule states are much higher than fair price protection rates for
companies in opt-in states (Georgia companies), which in turn are much
higher than fair price protection rates for companies in states with no statute.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present random effects logit specifications.
Although the logit coefficient estimates are difficult to interpret, the logit
specification estimates that both fair price default statutes and opt-in statutes
have positive effects on fair price protection rates that are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent significance level. This indicates that the large impacts
of the fair price statutes are not artifacts of the linear-probability model. The
coefficient estimates for Column 3 (which includes corporate governance
variables) and Column 4 (which excludes corporate governance variables)
are extremely similar, suggesting that endogeneity between corporate gov-
ernance variables and fair price protection rates is not the sole cause of the
importance of fair price statutes for fair price protection rates.
Companies that went public after the statute was passed have lower fair
price protection rates than otherwise similar companies. This finding is
consistent with the prediction that “midstream” companies are more
affected by corporate laws than otherwise similar companies that go public
after a statute was passed. Companies with classified boards and poison pills
are also more likely to have fair price protection, suggesting that fair price
anti-takeover protection is correlated with other forms of anti-takeover pro-
tection. Most other control variables do not have consistently noteworthy
effects on the probability of fair price protection.
The artificial “differences-in-differences” estimates in Table 5 are gen-
erally consistent with the random effects specification results in Table 4.
Even after controlling for company fixed effects, which should prevent bias
caused by unobservable time-invariant company traits that are correlated
with incorporation in a state with fair price laws, both the opt-in and default
fair price laws significantly raised the probability of a company incorporated
in a given state enjoying fair price protection. A default rule fair price statute
302 Listokin
is associated with a 0.71 increase in the probability of having fair price
protection compared to incorporating in a state with no fair price laws, after
controlling for company fixed effects. This estimate, which is significant at
the 1 percent level, is almost identical to the estimates presented in Table 4.
The existence of an opt-in fair price statute raises the probability of fair price
protection by 0.12 relative to the absence of any statute. This estimate, which
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, is approximately half the
absolute value of the random effects regressions, suggesting that unobserved
differences between Georgia firms and firms in states without fair price
statutes caused some, but not all, the difference in fair price protection rates
between the two groups of firms. Although the artificial nature of this
differences-in-differences estimation cautions against taking these estimates
too seriously, the broad similarity between these estimates and the cross-
sectional ones above suggests that the cross-sectional outcomes are not
merely the result of “other” factors correlated with fair price statutes but not
included in the regression estimates.
B. Interpretation
The results presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 strongly refute the triviality
hypothesis. According to the triviality hypothesis, differences in default rules
or the availability of menu options should not matter. Similar companies












Number of companies 2004
R 2 0.711
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Note: Results of differences-in-differences regressions with
change in fair price protection as the dependent variable, cor-
responding to Equation (2). Standard errors in parentheses.
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incorporated in states with different menu options or default rules should
have similar levels of anti-takeover protections. In fact, however, the differ-
ences in fair price availability matter enormously. Companies in the states
with a fair price menu statute are more likely to have fair price protection
than companies in states without statutes (the opt-in dummy has a positive
and significant marginal effect), but are much less likely to enjoy fair price
protection than companies in states where there is fair price default protec-
tion (the marginal effect of the default dummy is considerably higher than
the marginal effect of the menu dummy).
The results also help refute a subtle variant of the triviality hypothesis—
that these statutes are partially irrelevant in the era of the poison pill. If fair
price statutes truly were irrelevant, then why would so many Georgia com-
panies take the trouble to opt in to them—even those that went public after
the poison pill was firmly entrenched? If the response is that around 50
percent of companies care enough to opt in and the other half view the
statute as irrelevant,61 the next question is, why do not 50 percent of com-
panies in states with no statute adopt fair price charter amendments? In fact,
only 20 percent do;62 if 50 percent of companies care about fair price
protection, then they should pursue fair price protection regardless of
whether an opt-in menu statute exists. In the data, however, the fair price
menu statute dummy has a significantly positive marginal effect, which it
should not under the irrelevancy theory. This piece of evidence, along with
the fact that corporations aggressively pursued the enactment of all the
anti-takeover statutes analyzed here and the fact that a number of companies
continued to opt in to or write fair price provisions during the 1990s,
suggests that, at least at the time of enactment, the anti-takeover provisions
were salient considerations to many corporations rather than irrelevant or
partially irrelevant.63
61None of the Georgia companies in the sample have a controlling shareholder, so it is not the
case that some Georgia companies failed to opt in because they were closely controlled and
therefore did not need fair price protection.
62Corporations in these states may have slightly different preferences, which may explain some
of the distinction, but unless companies in Florida (an opt-out state) are radically different from
companies in Georgia (an opt-in state), which in turn are very different from companies in
Texas (a no-law state), then it is hard to understand such large differences stemming from
differences in state corporate preferences.
63See, e.g., Audio Recording of DE Hearings on the Adoption of DE’s Opt-Out
Business Combination Statutes (1988) (on file with author) (recording the threats of
304 Listokin
The results only partially comport with the transaction-cost minimiza-
tion rationale for corporate enabling laws. On the one hand, both opt-in and
opt-out states have drafted laws allowing companies to enjoy anti-takeover
protection. The costs of negotiating and drafting terms have been incurred
by the state in both cases and the network and delegation of modification
benefits should be comparable for both opt-in and opt-out statutes. Thus, it
is very difficult to explain the difference in outcomes between opt-in and
opt-out states in terms of transaction-cost minimization.
The effect of Georgia’s opt-in menu statute relative to the absence of
any statute, however, supports a transaction-cost minimization explanation.
Instead of drafting and modifying the terms of fair price protection, com-
panies in Georgia can enjoy fair price protection through a simple vote to
opt in to Georgia’s ready-made statute and can rely on the state to modify the
provision in the future if necessary. This reduction in cost enables Georgia
corporations that desire fair price protection but might be deterred by the
cost of creating or modifying such protection to enjoy fair price protection.
Similar companies in no-law, no-precedent states, by contrast, might choose
to economize on these costs by foregoing fair price protection. Thus, the
large impacts of corporate law menus support the transaction-cost minimi-
zation rationale for corporate enabling laws, contradicting those who have
argued that transaction-cost minimization is irrelevant for corporate law.64
The principal-agent mitigation theory of corporate law also receives
partial support. The large difference in outcomes between opt-in and opt-
out states is easy to understand from a principal-agent minimization perspec-
tive, however. Investors are more poorly informed than managers. In
addition, attempts by investors to overturn inefficient default rules are
plagued by free-rider problems and managerial control over the corporate
charter amendment process. Thus, anti-takeover default rule protections
persist, even when they are inefficient. It is no surprise that over 97 percent
of companies in opt-out states stick with the pro-manager default rule.
Managers, by contrast, are not hindered by these factors. So long as they can
convince shareholders to vote for changing the default rule, they will
succeed in altering the default. The data indicate that managers are suc-
cessful in changing the default rule reasonably frequently. The fact that
companies to reincorporate in states outside Delaware if the business combination statute was
not passed).
64See, e.g., Ayres, Making a Difference, supra note 3.
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managers in opt-in states are not always successful in changing the default
rule, however, indicates that anti-manager default rules are capable of con-
straining managers.65 The importance of opt-in menus, by contrast, contra-
dicts a narrow principal-agent minimization perspective. The default rule in
opt-in states and no-law, no-precedent states—nonapplication of fair price
provisions—is the same. In both categories of states, managers must con-
vince shareholders to alter the default rule and approve the fair price pro-
tections, thereby protecting investors. Thus, the difference in outcomes
between the two categories cannot be attributed to differences in bargaining
power, incentives, or corporate agenda control.
Thus, the impacts of menu statutes and default rules discovered here
are likely due to the combined effect of the transaction-cost-reducing and
principal-agent-problem mitigating aspects of the different statutes. The
effects of the default rules may also be the result of behavioral effects,
although these effects are unlikely to be particularly salient in this context.66
VI. Conclusion
The data examined above have several implications for theories and policies
of nonmandatory corporate law.
65Another interpretation of these results emphasizes that a lack of anti-takeover statutes might
serve as a signal of superior managerial quality. Signaling models typically allow for multiple
equilibria, including pooling equilibria, in which all firms adopt the same amount of protec-
tions, and separating equilibria, in which better managers have less protection than lesser
managers as a signal of the better manager’s higher quality. A change in default rule or menu
might change the equilibrium through one of two avenues. First, differences in transaction costs
imposed by different default laws and menus lead to different sets of equilibrium outcomes in
states with different types of laws. This effect, however, does not make one type of outcome more
likely than another in any way that correlates with the difference in transaction costs. As a result,
it cannot predict the results presented here. Second, differences in default laws may lead to
different equilibria by changing investors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs about what managers will
do. Opt-out laws might lead to a pooling equilibrium where investors believe that the presence
or absence of anti-takeover protections have no signaling value, and therefore all firms have
protection, while opt-in rules lead to a separating equilibria where the lack of protection is a
signal of quality. Too much should not be made of this possibility, however, because of the
notorious instability of pooling models and the difficulty of making firm statements about the
relative probabilities of pooling versus separating equilibria. For a discussion of signaling
models, see Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory ch. 3 (2005).
66See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (2002).
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The results strongly contradict the claim that corporate law is trivial.
The presence or absence of corporate menus leads to large differences in
outcomes—an empirical finding that has not been made before—as do
differences in default rules. Lawmakers and judges cannot rely on bargain-
ing between managers and investors to arrive at efficient outcomes regard-
less of the content of corporate law; instead, policymakers should invest the
time and energy to create value-enhancing default rules and menus.
The results offer guidelines for identifying value-maximizing corporate
enabling laws. Corporate enabling laws reduce transaction costs. By provid-
ing the imprimatur of the state, facilitating network effects, and reducing the
cost of continually updating corporate charters to reflect changes in the law
and the economy, corporate enabling laws provide a public good that allows
managers and investors to enjoy provisions that might be too costly to create
or negotiate from scratch.67 Transaction costs are reduced even when the
corporate enabling laws are offered as menus rather than instituted as
default laws. Thus, legislatures should offer limited menus of terms that
might be desirable in some corporate circumstances.
The transaction-cost-reducing effects of corporate enabling laws do not
imply that default rules should be majoritarian rules, however. The previous
section indicated that default rules in favor of management are more diffi-
cult to alter than default rules against management. Thus, states should
often choose anti-manager default rules, even if the anti-manager rule is not
the preference of the majority of corporations.
These findings support policies that combine the benefits of
transaction-cost minimization and investor protection. For any given corpo-
rate law issue, states should enact one or more “optional” laws. Each optional
law should implement a different corporate arrangement. One of the laws,
which restricts management, but is otherwise desirable, should be chosen as
the default rule. This recommendation reduces transaction costs by provid-
ing state templates, but prevents managerial opportunism by providing for
anti-manager default rules. It is important, however, that the state limit the
number of menu offerings. Too many menu offerings would limit the
67Future research should examine whether this public good could be provided by nonstate
actors, such as the American Law Institute. Terms from nonstate actors will always be subject to
greater legal uncertainty than state-created terms, however, because they are not binding on
courts. Moreover, it is not clear that nonstate bodies are subject to less pressure to deviate from
efficiency than state bodies. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of
Private Legislatures, 143 Pa. L. Rev. 595, 607–37 (1995).
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network effects created by state statutes, and hinder the ability of the state to
alter the statutes in response to economic developments, thereby hindering
the transaction-cost-minimizing benefits of menus.
Menu statutes also help address another concern about state statutes—
their openness to manipulation by concentrated interests. Menu statutes do
not bind any companies unless they choose to do so, so the costs of a menu
statute that was primarily motivated by inefficient public choice concerns will
be much lower than the cost of a similar default statute. In addition, the
necessity of approval by investors reduces the incentive for management to
lobby for menu statutes. Default statutes, by contrast, are much more likely
to attract heavy management lobbying and impose significant costs as a result
of public choice concerns.
The powerful impact of corporate default laws and menus found here
raises many questions for other areas of law. If default laws and menus have
this large an impact on the outcomes of large corporations, it is reasonable
to suspect that they may have similarly large impacts in other areas, such as
contract law, trust law, or even anti-discrimination law.68 Future research
should be devoted to determining the impacts of default laws and menus in
other areas of law.
68See Ayres, Menus Matter, supra note 4.
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